Alessandra Bonfiglioli

Assistant Professor

CEPR Research Affiliate

 

Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
08005 Barcelona
Spain
Tel.: +34 93 542 1681
Fax: +34 93 542 1746
e-mail:
alessandra.bonfiglioli@upf.edu  

 

(photo by Jordi Play)

 

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и CV

· Google Scholar

и Research

и Teaching

и Research Video

и Barcelona GSE Summer Forum: Trade, Growth and Income Distribution on June 8-9, 2015

и Barcelona GSE Summer Forum: Trade, Growth and Income Distribution on June 11-12, 2014

и Barcelona GSE Summer Forum: Trade, Growth and Income Distribution on June 12-13, 2013

и Workshop on Politics, Information and the Macroeconomy at CREI on May 13-14, 2011

и Workshop on Institutions, Contracts and Growth at IAE - CSIC on June 22-23, 2009

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и Research

Research Interests

- International Trade

- Growth and Income Distribution

- Political Economy

- Financial Economics

Publications

- Betting on Exports: Trade and Endogenous Heterogeneity (with Rosario Crinò and Gino Gancia), CEPR Discussion Paper 10938, The Economic Journal, forthcoming

Read the non-technical summary on Vox

 

- Comment on "Liquidity Constrained Exporters" by Thomas Chaney, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, forthcoming

- Growth, Selection and Appropriate Contracts (with Gino Gancia), Review of Economic Dynamics 17(1), 21-38 (January 2014)

- Uncertainty, Electoral Incentives and Political Myopia(with Gino Gancia), The Economic Journal 123, 373-400 (May 2013)

See the research video here

- Investor Protection and Income Inequality: Risk Sharing vs Risk Taking, Journal of Development Economics 99, 92-104 (September 2012) (online Appendix)

- North-South Trade and Directed Technical Change (with Gino Gancia),  Journal of International Economics 76, 276-295 (December 2008)

- Financial Integration, Productivity and Capital Accumulation, Journal of International Economics 76, 337-355 (December 2008), Reprinted in Ostry, Jonathan, Atish Ghosh and Mahvash Qureshi (Eds.) Capital Controls, Edward Elgar Publishing (2015) - extended working paper version (June 2008) here

- Explaining Co-movements Between Stock Markets: The Case of US and Germany (with Carlo A. Favero), Journal of International Money and Finance 24(8), 1299-1316 (December 2005)

Working papers and work in progress

- Economic Uncertainty and Structural Reforms (with Gino Gancia), CEPR Discussion Paper 10937, July 2016 (submitted)

Read the non-technical summary on Vox, Nada Es Gratis (in Spanish) and lavoce.info (in Italian)

Finalist for the 2016 prize Vanguardia de la Ciencia: press coverage in Spanish here and here

 

Does economic uncertainty promote the implementation of structural reforms? We answer this question using one of the most exhaustive cross-country panel data set on reforms in six major areas and measuring economic uncertainty with stock market volatility. To address endogeneity concerns, we propose various identification strategies, instrumenting uncertainty with world shocks to volatility and with natural disasters, terrorist attacks, political coups and revolutions. Across all specifications, we find that uncertainty has a positive and significant effect on the adoption of reforms. This result is robust to the inclusion of a large number of controls, including political variables, economic variables, crisis indicators, and a host of country, reform and time fixed effects. These findings are broadly consistent with recent models suggesting that uncertainty promotes reforms by mitigating agency problems between policy makers and voters.  

- Heterogeneity, Selection and Labor Market Disparities (with Gino Gancia), May 2016 (submitted)

Earlier version: CEPR Discussion Paper 9981, May 2014   

Read the non-technical summary on Vox and Nada Es Gratis (Spanish)

 

We propose a model in which differences in socioeconomic and labor market outcomes between ex-ante identical countries can be generated as multiple equilibria sustained by different beliefs on the value of effort for finding jobs. To do so, we study the incentives to improve ability in a model where heterogeneous firms and workers interact in a labor market characterized by matching frictions and costly screening. When effort in improving ability raises both the mean and the variance of the resulting ability distribution, a complementarity between workers' choises and firms' hiring strategies can give rise to multiple equilibria. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in ability is larger and induces firms to screen more intensively workers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is important for finding good jobs. In the low-effort equilibrium, ability is less dispersed and firms screen less intensively, which confirms the belief that effort is not so important. The model has novel implications for wage inequality, the distribution of firm characteristics, productivity, sorting patterns between firms and workers, and unemployment rates that can help explain observed differences across countries.

 

- Trade, Finance and Endogenous Firm Heterogeneity (with Rosario Crinò and Gino Gancia), March 2016 R&R at the Journal of the European Economic Association

Read the non-technical summary on Vox

 

We study how financial frictions affect firm-level heterogeneity and trade in a model where productivity differences across monopolistically competitive firms are endogenous and depend on investment decisions at the entry stage. By increasing entry costs, financial frictions soften competition and lower the value of investing in bigger projects with more dispersed outcomes. Hence, credit frictions make firms more homogeneous and hinder the volume of exports both along the intensive and the extensive margin. Export opportunities, instead, shift expected profits to the tail and increase the value of technological heterogeneity. We test these predictions using comparable measures of sale dispersion within 365 manufacturing industries in 119 countries, built from highly disaggregated US import data. Consistent with the model, financial development increases sale dispersion, especially in more financially vulnerable industries; sale dispersion is also increasing in measures of comparative advantage. These results are quantitatively important for explaining the effect of financial development and factor endowments on export sales.

 

- The Political Cost of Reforms, CEPR Discussion Paper 8421, May 2011, (early version of "Uncertainty, Electoral Incentives and Political Myopia")

Read the non-technical summary on Vox

- Financial Liberalization, Banking Crises and Growth: Assessing the Links (with Caterina Mendicino), October 2004

Discussions

- "Liquidity Constrained Exporters" by Thomas Chaney (October 2015)

- "Catalytic IMF? A Gross Flow Approach" by Aitor Erce and Daniel Riera-Crichton (June 2015)

- "The Real Effects of Capital Controls: Credit Constraints, Exporters and Firm Investment" by Laura Alfaro, Anusha Chari and Fabio Kanczuk (June 2014)

- "Sovereigns, Upstream Capital Flows, and Global Imbalances" by Laura Alfaro, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan and Vadym Volosovych (June 2013)

- "Quantifying Productivity Gains from Foreign Investment" by Christian Fons-Rosen, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Bent E. Sorensen, Carolina Villegas-Sanchez and Vadym Volosovych (March 2013)

- "Non-linear Growth Effects of Financial Development: Does Financial Integration Matter?" by Arjana Brezigar Masten, Fabrizio Coricelli and Igor Masten (June 2008)

- "Regulating Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: an Externality View" by Anton Korinek (April 2008)

- "Exporting and Economic Performance: Firm-Level Evidence From Spanish Manufacturing" by Josж Carlos Fariыas and Ana Martьn-Marcos (June 2006)

 

и Teaching

- Economьa Internacional 1 - UPF Undergraduate, Winter 2014, 2015 and 2016

- International Economics 1 - UPF Undergraduate, Fall 2014 and 2015

- International Trade - Master  ITFD, Fall 2008, Fall 2009, Winter 2011, Fall 2011 and Fall 2012

 

 

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