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PhD Students

Research

 

 

Andrea Pescatori, PhD Candidate

 

Incomplete Markets, Idiosyncratic Income Shocks and Optimal Monetary Policy (Job Market Paper !!)

Abstract

Credit Frictions Housing Prices and Optimal Monetary Policy Rules
Abstract - with
Caterina Mendicino
WP0442 Universitą Roma III

Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stability in a Monetary Union
Abstract - with Massimiliano Pisani

Previously circulated under the title ‘Fiscal Spillover in a Monetary Union

Debt Crisis and the Development of International Capital Markets
with Amadou Sy
IMF Working Papers WP04/44

Monetary Externalities in a New Keynesian Model

with Caterina Mendicino

2003 mimeo, SSE

The Role of Money in a New Keynesian Model: Bayesian Estimation of a Small DSGE Model
with Caterina Mendicino
2003 mimeo, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

BCE: un anno e mezzo di politica monetaria
with
Caterina Mendicino
Focus N.6 in "Economic Trand and Forecast", Banca di Roma, August 2000.

 

 

Abstracts

 

Households' Financial Imbalances and Optimal Monetary Policy (Job Market Paper)

A widespread result in monetary policy literature is that the price level should be stabilized and, as corollary, the nominal interest rate should vary with the Wicksellian determinants of the real interest rate. The present paper studies how this result is altered when the representative agent assumption is abandoned and financial wealth heterogeneity across households is introduced. I derive a welfare-based loss function for the policy maker which includes an additional target related to the cross-sectional distribution of household debt. My results differ from standard ones in two respects. First, thanks to its ability to affect interest payments volatility, monetary policy has real effects even in a flexible-price cashless-limit environment. Second, in a setup with nominal rigidities, price stability is no longer optimal. The extent of deviation from price stability depends on the initial level of debt dispersion. I use US micro data to calibrate the model and I find that the departure from price stability is still relatively small under the baseline calibration. Finally, the paper also studies the design of an optimal simple implementable rule. I find that rules that also include a separate target on debt dispersion outperforms standard Taylor rules.

 

Credit Frictions Housing Prices and Optimal Monetary Policy Rules

We try to asses the role of housing price movements in the optimal design of monetary policy rules. Even though the relevance of liquidity constraints for consumption behavior has been well documented in the empirical and theoretical literature little attention has been given to credit frictions at the household level in the monetary business cycle literature. This paper represents the first attempt of a welfare-based monetary policy evaluation in a model with heterogeneous agents and credit constraints at the household level. In order to evaluate optimal monetary policy we take advantage of the recent advances in computational economics by following the approach illustrated by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). Our results show that housing price movements should not be a separate target variable additional to inflation, in an optimally designed simple monetary policy rule

 

Fiscal Spillover in a Monetary Union

We analyze the effects of fiscal policy in a currency area. We develop a two-region model having sticky prices, a common monetary authority and regional fiscal policies. We break the ricardian equivalence and allow for keynesian effects of public expenditure introducing rule-of-thumb agents in each region. Main results are the following.

First, consistently with the empirical evidence, after a public spending shock in one region private agents demand for imports increases and the terms of trade appreciates. Second, a countercyclical fiscal rule can restore the Taylor principle and the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Finally, a countercyclical fiscal rule contributes to reduce

macroeconomic volatility.