Launch prices for new pharmaceuticals in the heavily regulated and subsidized Spanish market, 1995–2007

Jaume Puig-Junoy a,*, Beatriz González López-Valcárcel b

a Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Research Centre for Economics and Health (CRES), Barcelona, Spain
b Universidad de Las Palmas de GC, Department of Quantitative Methods in Management and Economics, Las Palmas, Canary Islands, Spain

A R T I C L E   I N F O
Article history:
Received 20 August 2013
Received in revised form 18 February 2014
Accepted 23 February 2014

Keywords:
Pharmaceuticals
Price competition
Price regulation

A B S T R A C T
This paper provides empirical evidence on the explanatory factors affecting introductory prices of new pharmaceuticals in a heavily regulated and highly subsidized market. We collect a data set consisting of all new chemical entities launched in Spain between 1997 and 2005, and model launch prices following an extended version of previous economic models. We found that, unlike in the US and Sweden, therapeutically “innovative” products are not overpriced relative to “imitative” ones after having controlled for other factors. Price setting is mainly used as a mechanism to adjust for inflation independently of the degree of innovation. The drugs that enter through the centralized EMA approval procedure are overpriced, which may be a consequence of market globalization and international price setting.

© 2014 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

The purpose of this study is to identify and quantify the factors influencing the price at the launch of new pharmaceuticals in a heavily regulated and highly subsidized market, Spain, which represents the fifth European and the seventh world market according to the volume of pharmaceutical sales. We model the weighted average price of new pharmaceuticals in the period 1997–2005.

Our hypothesis is that, as it has been observed for the Swedish and US markets [1,2], the incremental efficacy and safety or therapeutic value is a paramount determinant, but that price/reimbursement regulatory systems force a skimming pricing (high introductory prices) strategy for all products independently of their incremental efficacy.

The Spanish pharmaceutical market offers a prime example of a heavily regulated and publicly subsidized market. As in many industrialized countries, the market in Spain is centrally price-regulated (price-cap regulation, generic reference pricing, prices not inflation adjusted over time, and price updates rarely allowed) [3]. A public agency of the Ministry of Health is responsible for price setting and for funding conditions of public insurance coverage. The agency negotiates prices with the firm. Effective patient co-payment for pharmaceuticals was very low in the period 1997–2005 (user rates account for less than 7% of the total expenditure in ambulatory health care system prescription pharmaceuticals).

Previously to price setting, new drugs are approved. There are three different approval mechanisms: the only-for-Spain one; the mutual recognition mechanism (the drug is authorized in a particular country, and other European countries will recognize it automatically unless an objection is raised in 90 days); and the centralized approval mechanism through the EMA.
As the Spanish National Health Service (NHS) is the main payer of ambulatory prescription pharmaceuticals (around 80% of sales are financed by the NHS), on the one hand, there is an increased willingness to pay overtime in Spain, associated to the economic prosperity and GDP growth, but on the other hand the policymakers are aware that there is some risk of financial unsustainability of the public health service budget due to the budgetary impact of new pharmaceuticals. Cost containment policies have put great emphasis on maintaining traditional low prices, higher prices for new products being placed under increasing scrutiny, despite the fact that the increase in consumption is the main driver of the rise in expenditure [4].

Low regulated prices for old products have converted the Spanish market into an important source of parallel trade in the European Union [5].

The central hypothesis of this paper is grounded on two economic and regulatory aspects of the Spanish market for new pharmaceuticals dispensed in pharmacies and financed by the public insurer. First, the criteria of the Spanish laws on drugs since 1990 had established, as one of the main elements, that price should reflect the therapeutic value of the drug as well as the cost of comparable treatments [3,6,7]; and, second, it has been observed that the price of the products that have been on the market for some years suffers a progressive erosion because there are no automatic or explicit criteria for yearly updates to this price, being the result that old products show a decreasing trend in real prices, and this situation creates strong incentives for the pharmaceutical companies to introduce new higher-priced products on to the market [4].

The main contribution of this paper is to model the launch prices of new pharmaceuticals included in the NHS prescription drugs list, in a heavily regulated and highly subsidized market. We consider that pricing any new pharmaceutical is the result of a negotiation between firm representatives and government representatives (regulatory agencies and public health service payers). The regulatory agency, which is also in charge of the rating by therapeutic value, may use that rating to force prices downwards, particularly for those new drugs that have large potential markets. Of course the firm could in turn strategically select indications (market size) to maximize its objectives [8]. It could also decide to delay launch [9].

This paper is structured as follows. We first summarize the main contributions of the empirical literature on pricing new pharmaceuticals. Then, we discuss the economic framework and hypotheses. Equations and variables, data, and results are presented in the next two sections of the paper. The paper concludes with a section summarizing the main conclusions and policy implications.

2. Previous literature

Previous studies, detailed below, have documented price competition among patented pharmaceuticals in the US: Introductory prices are higher for innovative pharmaceuticals which are priced higher than existing substitutes, and high introductory prices tend to fall over time as more competitors enter the therapeutic market. These results are consistent with Dean’s [10] optimal pricing strategies for new products.

Lu and Comanor [1] modelled launch prices of 144 new pharmaceuticals introduced in the United States (US) between 1978 and 1987, relative to existing substitutes (LC model). They conclude that therapeutically “innovative” pharmaceuticals are introduced under a skimming strategy (high introductory prices, quality-based competition), while “imitative” pharmaceuticals are introduced under a penetration strategy (low introductory prices, price competition). The number of branded substitutes has a negative effect on actual launch prices and on subsequent price increases in the US. Similar results, observing some degree of therapeutic price competition, have been reported by other studies [11–13].

Despite the high prevalence of different forms of price/reimbursement regulation and public financing in most industrialized countries [14], the bulk of the empirical evidence on the pricing of new pharmaceuticals mainly refers to the US, where market prices prevail.

The study by Ekelund and Persson [2] compared pricing strategies for new pharmaceuticals in the price-regulated Swedish market and the US. Using identical explanatory variables as in the LC model for the regulated Swedish market, these authors conclude that launch price determinants of 218 new pharmaceuticals introduced in the Swedish (regulated) market between 1987 and 1997 are quite different. As in the US, Swedish introductory prices reflect the degree of therapeutic innovation, but all prices fall substantially over time for all products independently of their therapeutic gain (price increases are generally ruled out under the regulatory regime). That is, Swedish price regulation prevents penetration strategies for “imitative” pharmaceuticals. Also, unlike in the US market, in Sweden introductory and subsequent prices do not depend on the number of branded substitutes. These authors conclude that price regulation discourages price competition in this country.

In Canada, where pharmaceutical prices are regulated, Lexchin [15] observed that new patented brand-name drugs introduced between 1994 and 2003 did not compete on price. Benda et al. [16] studied drugs competing for the treatment of hypertension in Canada from 1997 to 2003 (angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors and angiotensin receptor blockers). They found that new entrants in the same therapeutic class have lower launching prices, but drugs belonging to new therapeutic class have higher prices.

Other recent papers investigated the determinants of the prices of branded prescription medicines, not only launch prices, under different regulatory regimes and generic entry. For 15 OECD countries, including United States, Kanavos and Vandoros [17] observed price

---

[1] The strategic wish of the innovative firm would be to launch new pharmaceuticals with high introductory prices, but the public regulator and the payers will try to force the price downwards if budgetary impact is a concern. Budgetary pressure will increase with the number of patients that are expected to receive subsidized prescriptions of that new pharmaceutical, and will decrease with higher co-payment rates.
convergence across countries for newer prescription medicines compared with older medicines and that product age has a significant effect on prices in all settings. There is also a wide literature on pharmaceutical competition and market dynamics mainly devoted to explain the behavior of brand price after generic entry, that is, price response to generic entry of brand-name products [18–20].

Regulators and third party-payers consider other factors than the degree of therapeutic innovation in their pricing/reimbursement negotiations, such as concern for budgetary impact (which depends on the expected number of prescriptions, and their co-payment rate), and other industrial policy goals (such as allowing higher prices for national firms, or attracting R&D investment), which need to be considered in the empirical model to explain introductory and subsequent prices. In addition to this, the authorization process for new drugs has been progressively centralized in Europe. At present, some drugs are authorized by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) while others are authorized at national level. While the authorization process has been progressively centralized in Europe, the pricing process is still nationally based. Since 2004, most of biologics, as well as all new cancer drugs, HIV, diabetes and other conditions have to be centrally approved by EMA. The question is whether the centralized/decentralized pathways to the market are associated with higher or lower launch prices.

3. Economic framework and hypotheses

In the price/reimbursement negotiation in any given country, Danzon et al. [21] hypothesized that launch of a new chemical entity (NCE) occurs when the government’s maximum introductory offer price for it is equal to or higher than the firm’s ask price (or reservation price).

We assume that according to what is established in the Spanish laws since 1990, the government’s introductory offer price may be determined by the incremental health impact of the innovation and its impact on the incremental use of resources (incremental degree of innovation over existing close substitutes), the price of existing close therapeutic substitutes, the buyer’s willingness to pay for incremental units of health outcomes, the budgetary impact of the new product for the buyer, and the contribution to other industrial policy goals of interest to the government (the contribution to the national economy) [3].

The firm’s choice of ask price in the price/reimbursement process may be determined by the degree of innovation over close substitutes, indication for acute or chronic conditions, and the number of competitors (brands and generics), but also by the potential spillover effects of the price in that particular country when its prices are used as an external reference by other countries [22].

The maximum relative introductory price of an NCE $i$, in a given price-regulated country, over that of its close substitutes $c$ offered by the government ($p_{IC}^{\text{max}}$) may be higher if the new product has demonstrated superior health outcomes (efficacy, safety, side-effects, etc.) and if it reduces patient consumption of other health services (inpatient stays, physician visits, etc.). That is, $p_{IC}^{\text{max}}$ will be higher for higher differences in efficacy ($E_i - E_c$); however, the premium price over that of close substitutes will be dependent on willingness to pay (WTP$_i$) for these incremental health outcomes. WTP may be time dependent (i.e., increasing over time as income and health value improve), and it may also be different for different types of conditions or illnesses [23]. Changes in the use of other health service resources (i.e., hospital stays, medical visits, etc.) associated with the use of the NCE may be of importance to the government: the maximum relative price offered by the government may be higher when differences in cost ($C_i - C_c$) are larger [21].

However, the government, acting also as the main payer for the use of the NCE, is highly concerned by the expected budgetary impact of the innovation. The cost-conscious government (public insurance agency) will offer an introductory price $p_{IC}^{\text{max}}$ that will generate an expected maximum expenditure on the treatment of the illnesses for which the NCE $i$ is indicated equal to or lower than its target pharmaceutical budget in the launch year. In the price/reimbursement negotiation, the government’s concern for budgetary impact will be the result of the potential volume (Q$_0$) and the rate of co-payment in the insurance system for the pharmaceutical in the same therapeutic class (CO$_i$). That is, under the prevailing budget silo mentality in the cost containment policies of many European countries, including the case of Spain [24], the product of the dispensed quantity of the NCE $i$ by its incremental price and by its co-payment rate should be less than or equal to the maximum budget increase considered acceptable by the government.

Notwithstanding, aside from health care policy goals, the government’s maximum introductory price offer for the NCE may also be influenced by other industrial policy objectives of interest related to the production of product $i$ (IP$_i$). In most industrialized countries, the price regulation mechanism for NCEs is used to provide non-market incentives through higher price premiums to firms that commit themselves to maintaining or increasing employment and locating production and R&D investment in the country, or to those firms launch in their home country [14]. In Spain, Law 55/1999 established that price should also reflect some political issues such as the contribution to the national economy [3]. Of course, other R&D incentives may be present in some countries, such as tax credits.

Then, the government’s maximum offer price $p_{IC}^{\text{max}}$ can be written as

$$p_{IC}^{\text{max}} = f(E_i - E_c, \text{WTP}_i, (C_i - C_c), Q_i, \text{CO}_i, \text{IP}_i)$$

The firm’s ask price (or reservation introductory price) for an NCE $i$ ($p_{IC}^{\text{min}}$) may be hypothesized to be adequately represented by the explanatory factors included in the unregulated Lu and Comanor model. In this model, the firm’s choice of pricing strategy depends on the degree of innovation (incremental efficacy and changes in the use of resources; that is, $E_i - E_c$, and $C_i - C_c$), the anticipated number of repeated purchases (which are less likely for pharmaceuticals indicated for acute conditions, ACUTE$_i$), and the presence in the market of two types of rivals or competitors (branded substitutes and generic versions of substitutes) for product $i$ (COMP$_i$), given that, assuming
some buyers’ price sensitivity, the indirect competition of substitutes sets limits to the monopoly power of the NCE. The potential sales volume \( Q_i \) should also be an argument in the firm’s asking price for a new NCE with an expected sign that is not determined a priori. On the one hand, the larger the potential market, the stronger the incentive of the firm to negotiate hard, pushing up prices; but on the other hand, the larger the potential market, the stronger the penalization imposed by the delay in terms of lost sales during the patent protection period.

Additionally, in the price/reimbursement negotiation process, \( p_i^\text{min} \) may also be influenced by the potential spillover effects of the introductory price of \( i \) from parallel trade and external reference pricing \((S_j)\). The European Union (EU) explicitly permits parallel trade between EU members. Regulated markets with low pharmaceutical prices are a source of parallel trade and a reference for those countries that increasingly use the lower prices in other countries to regulate prices in their own country [25]. Leopold et al. [5] noted that among those 24 EU Member States that use external reference pricing, the United Kingdom \((n = 11/24)\) was among the most frequently referenced, following Germany \((13/24)\), Spain \((13/24)\) and France \((11/24)\). Then, Spanish prices are used as a reference for nearly half of the 27 EU countries.

Then, the firm’s ask price \( p_i^\text{min} \) can be written as

\[
p_i^\text{min} = g((E_i - E_i, (C_C - C_i), \text{ACUTE}_i, \text{COMP}_i, S_i) \tag{2}
\]

As we are interested in price determinants of effectively launched products, we assume that negotiation results in launch of the product at the introductory price \( P_i^\text{m} \) over that of its close substitutes, which is equal to or higher than \( p_i^\text{min} \) and equal to or lower than \( p_i^\text{max} \). Relative introductory prices as a result of the negotiating process will be influenced by the bargaining power of the firm launching the new product \((B_i)\) when negotiating with the regulatory agency of the country [26].

Then, the \( P_i^\text{m} \) function can be written as

\[
P_i^\text{min} = g((E_i - E_i, (C_C - C_i), \text{WTP}_i, (C_C - C_i), Q_i, \text{CO}_i, \text{IP}_i); \tag{3}
\]

with \( p_i^\text{min} \leq P_i^\text{m} \leq p_i^\text{max} \).

The reduced form for Eq. (3) can be written as

\[
P_i^\text{m} = h((E_i - E_i), \text{WTP}_i, (C_C - C_i), Q_i, \text{CO}_i, \text{IP}_i, \text{ACUTE}_i, \text{COMP}_i, S_i; B_i) \tag{4}
\]

The relative introductory price of NCE \( i \) over that of its close substitutes \( c \) is expected to be positively related to incremental efficacy, willingness to pay for health outcomes, cost offsets, co-payment rate, contribution to the achievement of industrial policy goals, treatment of acute conditions, potential spillovers, and bargaining power of the launching firm. We expect this price to be negatively correlated with the number of competitors in the market, and with potential volume of sales.

4. Empirical analysis

4.1. Equation and variables

In the empirical model, we use logarithmic transformation for prices and quantities, as usual. We also apply logarithms to the time in market (age) and to the number of competitors in order to scale the effects in terms of relative changes.

For Eq. (4), we specify the following regression equation:

\[
L_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{RATE}_A + \alpha_2 \text{RATEB}_i + \alpha_3 t_{tg} + \alpha_4 \text{NEO}_i + \alpha_5 \text{LAGE}_i + \alpha_6 \text{LQC}_i + \alpha_7 \text{HOME}_i + \alpha_8 \text{ACUTE}_i + \alpha_9 \text{LNUM}_{10} + \alpha_{10} \text{DGEN}_i + \alpha_{11} \text{TOP}_i + \alpha_{12} \text{FDA_NO}_{i} + \alpha_{13} \text{EMA} + \epsilon \tag{5}
\]

where \( L_i \) is the natural logarithm of the relative introductory price of NCE \( i \) in relation to the price of its close therapeutic substitutes (log of the price ratio). \( \text{RATE}_A \) is the dummy variable that equals 1 if NCE \( i \) receives a rating of A (important therapeutic gain, defined in the next subsection). \( \text{RATEB}_i \) is the dummy variable that equals 1 if NCE \( i \) receives a rating of B (modest therapeutic gain, defined in the next subsection). \( t_{tg} \) is the year of price authorization of NCE \( i \) \((i = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, 8)\). \( \text{NEO}_i \) is the dummy variable that equals 1 if NCE \( i \) belongs to the therapeutic group L (antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents). \( \text{LAGE}_i \) is the natural logarithm of the average number of years in the market for close therapeutic substitutes until price approval of NCE \( i \), weighted by volume of sales. \( \text{LQC}_i \) is the natural logarithm of the number of DDDs of the close therapeutic substitutes of NCE \( i \) sold the year before its approval, adjusted by its effective patient co-payment rate. \( \text{HOME}_i \) is the dummy variable that equals 1 if NCE \( i \) has been launched in the originator or licensee firm’s country. \( \text{ACUTE}_i \) is the dummy variable that equals 1 if NCE \( i \) is indicated for an acute illness. \( \text{LNUM}_{10} \) is the natural logarithm of the number of branded close therapeutic substitutes for NCE \( i \) in the launch year. \( \text{DGEN}_i \) is the dummy variable that equals 1 if a close brand-name substitute has a generic rival at the time of the new product’s introduction. \( \text{TOP}_i \) is the dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm selling NCE \( i \) is one of the top 15 selling pharmaceutical firms in the country the year before NCE introduction. \( \text{FDA_NO}_{i} \) is the dummy variable that equals 1 if the drug has never been approved by the FDA. \( \text{EMA} \) is the dummy variable that equals 1 if the drug has been centrally approved by the EMA (vs. mutual recognition procedure).

In Eq. (5) the degree of innovation, comprising incremental efficacy and cost offsets, is measured by ratings of new pharmaceuticals in class A and class B, where the omitted category corresponds to products with little or no therapeutic gain, and to products for which there was not enough evidence to establish their therapeutic advance at the introduction. We also include a dummy for NCEs that have never been approved in the US. This is an exogenous
proxy for low therapeutic gain or innovative degree of the
drug. Government willingness to pay is measured by three
variables: the year of price authorization (\(t_{i}\)), assuming
an increasing willingness to pay over time, related to the
large income increase observed during the period; the therapeu-
tic group L (antineoplastic and immunomodulating
agents), assuming a higher willingness to pay for more
life threatening conditions; and the weighted age of close
substitutes (LAGE\(_{ij}\)), assuming a higher willingness to pay
for NCEs indicated for conditions with older treatments.
A higher willingness to pay positively related to the age
of close substitutes would also be recognition of a more
notable erosion of older prices of close substitutes by infla-
tion given that these prices have not usually been inflation
adjusted in Spain; but also, this regulatory feature may rep-
resent a clear incentive for the firm to rapidly introduce
new products in substitution for older ones with declining
real prices. Industrial policy objectives are represented in
Eq. (8) by a variable (HOME\(_{i}\)) indicating that the NCE has
been introduced in the market by a Spanish firm (this firm
may be the originator or a licensee\(^2\)). Potential volume
of sales is measured by the number of DDDs of the close therapeu-
tic substitutes of NCE \(i\) sold the year before its approval,
adjusted by its effective patient co-payment rate, which
represents the budget impact concern of the government
(expected negative price effect), but also the importance
of potential spillovers as perceived by the firm (expected
positive price effect). We assume the parallel trade risk to
be higher for higher-volume NCEs than for smaller product
volumes. Finally, bargaining power is represented in this
equation by a dummy variable (TOP\(_{i}\)) which identifies the
15 top-selling firms in Spain the year before price author-
ization. The bargaining power is expected to be higher for
larger firms. We include a dummy variable for the EMA
centralized approval procedure. It has an expected positive
sign because it increases the bargaining power of the firm
in Spain, as it tends to homogenize international prices,
bringing Spain closer to the average of EU prices.

Eq. (5) was estimated by least squares. Heteroskedastic-
ity tests were performed in order to use robust estimators
of variances if needed. We calculated influence statistics to
look for potential or real influential NCEs, and we defined
outliers as observations with residuals larger than two
standard deviations. Variance inflation factors for the con-
tinuous explanatory variables were calculated to explore
multicollinearity, as some of the explanatory variables in
Eq. (5) show high bivariate correlations.

We also estimated restricted models containing only the
therapeutic rating and time trend. In model 1, rates A and B
enter in equation, as defined previously. In model 2, rate A
and rate B are collapsed in a dummy variable equal to one
if the new drug has been rated as A or B.

4.2. The data

The data set consists of all pharmaceuticals approved by
the Spanish Health Ministry between 1997 and 2005.

In this period, 288 new pharmaceuticals were approved
in Spain. We included new drugs for ambulatory thera-
pies. Of these products, we excluded 174 from the present
analysis for various reasons. First, 120 products were only
used or dispensed in hospitals. They were excluded because
the mechanism of price negotiation with health authorities
is different than for ambulatory drugs. A second category
of excluded products consists of 17 other products such
as hormones, vaccines and diagnostic devices in order to
keep the sample homogeneous. Thirteen products were
excluded because they were not covered by the National
Health Service (NHS) insurance system. Twenty-one topi-
cal agents (creams, lotions, and ophthalmic solutions) for
which a recommended daily dose cannot be easily estab-
lished were also excluded. Finally, three products did not
show any sales to the NHS during the period and were also
excluded. Our data set thus includes a total of 114 new
chemical entities (NCEs).

Our dataset contains the out-patient pharmaceutical
prescription prices paid by the government and recorded by
the Directorate-General of Pharmacy and Health Pro-
ducts of the Ministry of Health and Consumer Affairs. This
information has been complemented with data from the
‘Nomenclator Digitalis’ of the NHS Health Information
Institute and from the ‘Base de Datos del Conocimiento
Sanitario 2005—BOT PLUS’ (Consejo General de Colegios
Oficiales de Farmacéuticos).

In this study, we define the price of an NCE as the average
weighted price (AWP) per defined daily dose (DDD). A
DDD is defined as the average daily dose of an NCE used
by an adult for treatment of the main indication of the phar-
macetical. The price of a new drug has been determined
as the weighted average ex-factory price (WAP) without
VAT\(^3\) per defined daily dose (DDD) in the first quarter in
the market. Discounts or rebates have not been reported for
new pharmaceuticals in Spain, so we may confirm that
our price data do not overstate NCE consumer prices. Sales
of each pack type – different form and/or dosage and/or
number of units – of NCE, to the NHS have been used as the
weighting structure. Pharmaceutical sales financed by the
NHS represent most of the sales of prescription drugs in the
Spanish market; therefore, we may consider NHS sales mix
as an adequate proxy for the complete market\(^4\).

We used the DDD system recommended by the World
Health Organization for studies of drug use in order to
define comparable dosages. Official DDDs were available
for most NCEs. For the remaining drugs, recommended

\(^2\) Publicly available information to distinguish between licensees and
originators has not been available to the authors.

\(^3\) Ex-factory prices excluding VAT have been calculated from regulated
consumer prices deducting VAT rates and time variant regulated margins
set for wholesalers and pharmacies by the Spanish Health Ministry. Con-
sumer prices were originally also published in the bulletin “Información
Terapéutica del Sistema Nacional de Salud” (Therapeutic Information of
the NHS). Time variant regulated margins set for wholesalers and pharmacies
by the Spanish Health Ministry in 2005 were 8.6% and 27.9%, respectively.

\(^4\) AWP per DDD(\(j\)) = \(\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{\text{Price per Pack}_{i}}{\text{Sales of Pack}_{i}} \right) \times \left( \frac{\text{Sales of Pack}_{i}}{\text{DDD of Pack}_{i}} \right) \)

where AWP is the average weighted price per defined daily dose, DDD is
the defined daily dose, \(j\) is the a new active ingredient (new drug), \(i\) is the
a pack type of the new active ingredient \(j\), sales is the sales valued in Euros
during the first quarter in the market.
daily doses were obtained from the files of the public Spanish Drug Agency.

We identified close substitutes of an NCE as those chemical entities that share the same indication, have the same or similar routes of administration, and that were the most commonly prescribed medicines among those with the same indication and route of administration in the year immediately preceding the introduction of the new drug. Usually, close substitutes belong to the same broadly defined chemical class, but this is not always the case; thus, in our study, being the most commonly prescribed pharmaceutical entity for the same indication the year before the introduction of the NCE was the main criterion to identify close substitutes in order to measure more accurately the pharmaceutical prices paid by the NHS for the same condition before NCE introduction.

In this study, close substitutes of each NCE were identified by taking advantage of the information about each new pharmaceutical approved in Spain that periodically appeared in the section titled “New active ingredients” of “Información Terapéutica del Sistema Nacional de Salud” (Therapeutic Information of the NHS), a regular publication of the Spanish Health Ministry, which covers all the years included in the present study. We identified at least one close substitute for each of the 114 NCEs included in our study.

We defined an NCE as acute if it is intended for conditions lasting no more than three months. A pharmacy expert was consulted in this regard.

No official centrally established rating of therapeutic advance is available for pharmaceuticals in Spain. However, the cited publication of the Spanish Health Ministry “Therapeutic Information of the National Health Service” published an unofficial rating similar to that of the US Food and Drug Administration. We will call it the regulator rating (RR). It has two main limitations for this study: first, the lack of information for the last three years of the study (24 NCEs); and, second, its potentially endogenous nature as a central government rating that may be used by the government regulator as a tool in the price/reimbursement negotiation with the firm. There is also an insurer rating (IR) for the therapeutic advance of NCEs in Spain, which covers the whole period of our study. It has been issued by several regional governments, which are in charge of decentralized financing/buying of pharmaceuticals and management of health services. Six NCEs were not evaluated in the IR. The IR could also be a biased proxy for the true innovation value of new drugs, because it is in the interest of regional governments to avoid paying for expensive medicines, therefore they could rate new drugs systematically below their true therapeutic value, and it could be endogenous because expensive drugs could be downgraded in an opportunistic behavior. Nevertheless, the IR is less susceptible of endogeneity because it is issued ex-post (after price negotiation) by regional governments, which are not directly involved in the pricing/reimbursement negotiation process, and as such, it represents a broader, more official, and potentially more evidence-based consensus than the RR.

The therapeutic advance associated with an NCE is measured, in both the RR and the IR, by the following ratings: A is important therapeutic gain; B is moderate therapeutic gain; C is little or no therapeutic gain; D is not enough clinical information or experience to establish therapeutic advance at launch. It is worth noting here that evaluating therapeutic gain is especially difficult when relying on pre-market clinical trials that are universally sponsored by the company requesting reimbursement. Company sponsored clinical trials have been repeatedly shown to have a positive bias. We include in the model dummy regressors for rates A and B. An alternative model combines the categories A and B in an A + B category. We also include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the FDA never approved the drug. We assume that it is exogenous to the price in Spain, and those drugs that were never approved in the US should probably have low therapeutic value. We expect, then, a negative sign.

Finally, we included a dummy variable (EMA) for the drugs centrally approved by the European Agency. The rest (EMA equals 0) were approved only in Spain, or through the mutual recognition procedure.

We expect a positive sign.

5. Results

5.1. Summary statistics

Table 1 reports univariate statistics and bivariate associations with the relative launch prices for continuous variables (Table 1A) and categorical variables (Table 1B).

All continuous variables have large variances. Relative launch prices are significantly correlated with the number of years of competitors in the market and with the number of competitors. Only one new drug defines the category A. It is indicated for some specific types of cancer, it was approved by the EMA in 2001 and it started to be marketed in Spain in 2002. Although relative launch prices by rating groups have average values that compare as expected (A higher than B, and B higher than the rest), the ANOVA test fails to find any significant differences in relative launch prices by therapeutic value. Fig. 1 shows the scatter plot of relative launch prices and number of years of competitors in the market, with rates of innovation displayed. Oncological and life threatening condition drugs are priced significantly above the rest. Local companies have lower prices than foreign companies, but differences are not significant. Drugs for acute conditions are priced above drugs for chronic conditions. Top companies do not differ from the rest. Those drugs that have been approved by the EMA in a centralized process have significantly higher prices.
Comparing the two alternative ratings, IR and RR, notable disagreements are found. The IR is more demanding than the RR, as expected.

5.2. Regression results

Table 2 reports the estimation results of the unrestricted model (5) and the restricted models including only the therapeutic rating and time trend (models I and II). Therapeutic value does not influence the relative launch price significantly, although signs are as expected. Lack of significance does not seem to be due to collinearity because the variance inflation factors (VIF) of RATEA and RATEB are low (1.19 and 1.18, respectively). Table 2 reports the estimation results of three models. Models I and II are restricted because they only include the explanatory variables for time trend and innovation. In model I, innovation is measured through two dummy variables for categories A and B respectively. In model II, both are combined in a dummy equal to one if the new drug is categorized as innovative (A or B). Model III adds the remaining X variables as control variables. Innovation is measured with the two dummies as in model I. We have estimated a version of model III (model IIIb, not shown) in which innovation is measured as in model II. Neither RATEA nor RATEB are significant in models I or III. The combined variable RATEAB is significant only at 5% in model II and it is insignificant in model IIIb. The number of years of competitors in the market is highly significant, and its standardized coefficient is the largest one. Competitive pressure, measured through the number of competitors in the market, is significant and it has a large coefficient (–0.43). It is correlated with market size, because drugs with large sales in DDDs the year before launch had more competing firms (linear correlation = 0.62). This is why market size is not significant (and it has the wrong sign). In fact, the VIF of market size (LQC) is the highest (2.12). The variance of estimators is more than double than if there were no nonlinearity. Therefore, we cannot know if LQC does not have any influence or we are not able to detect it, given the data we use.
Neither is the presence of generic firms significant. The coefficient of centralized approval (EMA) is positive, large and significant. Cancer drugs have a significant premium after controlling for the rest of the covariates. Their coefficient (0.97) can be interpreted as follows: the relative launch price of an oncological drug is 2.6 times that of a non-oncological drug. On the other hand, acute indications are penalized in Spain, compared to drugs for chronic conditions. The coefficient (-0.38) shows that drugs for acute conditions are priced at a level that is only 68% of the relative price of a similar drug for a chronic condition. As in the bivariate analysis, neither top companies nor local companies differ significantly in launch price of their subsidized drugs.

The Breusch-Pagan test does not reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity ($BP = 14.18, p = 0.36$).

There are four positive outliers with standardized residuals larger than 2, and two negative outliers with standardized residuals smaller than $-2$. Two of the positive outliers are drugs launched in 1999 by local companies, and the other two are drugs launched in 1997. The two negative outliers were launched in 2001 and 2002 respectively. One is a non-oncological drug with NEO = 1 for prevention of organ reject after transplant. All outliers have small market sizes.

Two limitations of the study are the sample size ($n = 114$) and the problems of collinearity. Both are responsible for the lack of robustness of the model results to small changes.
in the definition of therapeutic innovation. However, this sample of 114 drugs is in fact the population of new drugs launched on the Spanish market during the period of study. The implied challenge in this context is to know whether our findings can be generalized to other years, and whether they describe stable phenomena of cause-effect relationships. Our model fitting is good. The method used to determine close substitutes is not perfect, but it is the usual method in market studies of drug entries.

6. Conclusions and policy implications

Contrary to expectations and to the results published by Lu and Comanor [1] for the US and by Ekelund et al. [2] for Sweden, in Spain the therapeutic value or degree of innovation does not seem to be a key factor in determining the launch price of new drugs. Price setting is mainly used as a mechanism to adjust for inflation erosion independently of the degree of innovation.

Notwithstanding, there are difficulties to measure the degree of innovation of new drugs objectively and exogeneously. We have discussed some alternatives in our text. In Spain, ratings by the public regulator and by the public insurer are potentially endogenous, in opposite ways. The regulator could use his rating to justify the prices he has authorized. The insurer could opportunistically underqualify the most innovative drugs in order to control expenditure. The alternative unofficial ranking provided by the pharmaceutical councils was not significant either. We used alternative proxies for innovation, such as the dummy for being first in class proposed by Grabowski et al. [27], but we did not get significant results for this either. A proxy for (lack of) therapeutic value that is clearly exogenous is the dummy of non-approval by the FDA. According to the model, these drugs have lower launch prices, although the difference is not statistically significant.

While none of the three explanatory variables describing the therapeutic value in our model is significant, their signs are as expected. Our finding that the price of new drugs is hardly influenced by their degree of innovation is robust to alternative measures, all potentially problematic, of degree of innovation. The fact that in Spain, unlike in Sweden and other European countries, there is not a fourth threshold of cost-effectiveness for new drugs could help to explain our result that price does not depend on therapeutic value. In the price negotiation there is no need to justify prices with evidence on effectiveness or cost per QALY at different levels of price.

Our study suggests that reforms need to be introduced in Spain so that therapeutic value is adequately taken into account. Then, a policy implication of our results is that, regarding the international experience, the information obtained from economic evaluations could be useful to coherently allocate the available health resources with prices more related with added therapeutic value and incremental cost-effectiveness. In this context, curiously, Spain is until now one of the few European countries that have yet to effectively adopt a clear policy on this question despite what has been established in recent laws [28,29]. Incidentally, after the crisis aftermath the central and regional governments introduced some changes in this regard, including the Therapeutic Positioning Reports [30].

The main contributing factor to predict the relative launch price is the average age of competitors on the market. In Spain, once the price of a new drug is set, it will be only occasionally reviewed, except when ad-hoc price cuts are imposed by the regulator. Therefore, in practice, the setting of prices for new drugs is also a mechanism of adjustment for inflation. Our model points clearly to this fact. Because we have selected only new molecules, our model is not sensitive to the plausible strategic behavior of those firms that ask for authorization of old drugs by disguising them as new ones, for instance setting new combinations of old molecules, in order to update prices against inflation erosion. A policy implication of these results is that the regulation leading to old and very effective products showing a decreasing trend in real prices, has been creating also strong incentives for the pharmaceutical companies to introduce new higher-priced products on to the market that do may not always represent a significant improvement in effectiveness.

We acknowledge that sometimes costs are a factor in determining prices even though pricing and reimbursement processes increasingly are moving away from cost-regulation toward ‘value-based’ pricing. As in other published studies, we omitted R&D costs in the model because they are not available. We think there is no variable omission bias because costs could not be correlated to the included explanatory variables.

An interesting new finding of this study is that drugs centrally authorized by the EMA have relative prices at launch 70% higher than the launch prices of other drugs. This effect is large, very significant and robust to changes in the model specification. According to Eq. (5), if the price of existing close therapeutic substitutes of EMA and non-EMA drugs are equivalent, then our analysis concludes that absolute prices at launching are higher for new drugs that have been centrally approved at European level. A possible explanation of this result is that those drugs that were centrally approved have more homogeneous prices among countries because their markets are more globalized. As drug prices in Spain are on average lower than in most countries, and below the European average, centrally approved drugs are priced above the rest in Spain. In summary, the dummy variable for centralized approval could reflect the combined effect of market factors and regulation factors in a globalized context. There is no difference between the top 15 companies and the rest. There is no evidence that the more innovative drugs are centrally approved. However, the positive and significant coefficient of the centralized EMA approval might also reflect a higher therapeutic gain of those drugs. In that case, it could happen that our model underestimates the effect of innovation.

Companies try to speed up the introduction of new drugs in markets, particularly in the larger ones. The countdown to patent expiry is a key element in the profitability of the new drug throughout its lifetime. But in the negotiation game, the company could possibly prefer to delay the launch in order to avoid suffering spillover effects of lowering international reference prices. We introduced into the model the time elapsed from the first authorization of the
drug to its launch in Spain. We expected a negative effect, because large delays could reflect harder negotiations in Spain, finishing up with prices less favourable to the company. However, we did not find any significant effect.

Competition influences prices, as expected. The more competitors, the lower the relative launch price, as in the US. Market concentration is also responsible for higher prices for antimalarial drugs in developing countries [31]. But in Spain the presence of substitutive generic drugs does not influence the price. The volume of the market, measured through the number of DDDs sold the year before the launch by competitor drugs, apparently does not influence the launch price either. This lack of significance of the market volume could be due to the positive correlation with the number of competitors, which is a significant regressor in the model. Perhaps it would be more relevant to include the potential expected market ceiling – instead of real sales – which could be approximated with data on morbidity. Some medical conditions, such as Alzheimer’s disease or obesity, have a large market potential, in terms of unmet demand, because of the lack of effective drugs. In fact, in the past, the appearance of innovative drugs for certain conditions increased the number of patients treated for such conditions. For instance, the new antidepressants launched since the 1980s increased consumption of antidepressants in the US from 5 to 460 million DDDs between 1988 and 1997 [32]. Incidentally, there are no available data on the potential market for each drug in our study.

Drug characteristics are important determinants of prices. In Spain, where drug prices are traditionally low, the treatment of life threatening conditions, including cancer, is overpriced. According to the model, all other factors being equal, the relative launch price of a drug against a life threatening disease is 2.65 times ($e^{0.9545}$) higher than that of other drugs. There is abundant literature, more often theoretical or based on social values than empirical, on the social willingness to pay for these kinds of treatments [23].

In our study we found that overpricing is more specific to cancer than to generic immunomodulating drugs, because two out of the three non-oncological drugs, which prevent organ rejection after transplant, have negative residuals. One of the three is even an outlier.

Unlike the US and Sweden, in Spain acute treatments have a price penalty. This result is the opposite of what we expected because in Spain acute treatments generally have higher co-payments than drugs for chronic conditions. In fact, this result could indicate a negative relationship between co-payment rates and prices, which may be in line with the hypothesis that decreasing the insurance coverage increases the competition intensity [33]. The result for acute drugs is robust to alternative specifications, but it is sensitive to the precise definition of acute treatment. It would be useful to dig deeper into the causes, as it may be that our finding cannot be generalized. In our database, acute treatments are not associated with a better or worse therapeutic value, and neither are they associated with the number of years the competing drugs have been on the market.

We assumed that the parallel trade risk would be higher for higher-volume NCEs than for smaller product volumes, and that the bargaining power is higher for larger firms; and, we also implicitly assumed that parallel trade risk and bargaining power are exogenous, that is, uncorrelated to the stochastic error of the equation. It might happen that this assumption is not held in some cases.

Another limitation is the omission of variables that are potentially explanatory, related to the European context. We included the dummy of centralized approval by the EMA but we omitted, due to lack of data, other international references of spillover effects and contagion effects [21], which could change the bargaining power of the company. The average price previously approved in other countries (international reference price) and the number of European countries that previously approved both the drug price and its funding conditions would have been potentially useful regressors in our model. They were not included either in the Swedish model, which makes that comparison of results between Sweden and Spain easier. Also, data on R&D and advertising expenditures have not been available at molecule level.

In summary, in Spain innovation is not a key factor in determining the launch price of new drugs according to our study, through the measure of innovation could have measurement problems, as we argued along the text. Drugs centrally authorized, drugs for treating life threatening diseases, and drugs for chronic conditions (unlike the US) are overpriced. The more the number of competitors, the lower the launch relative price, but the presence of substitutive generic drugs does not influence the price. Price setting is mainly used as a mechanism to adjust for inflation erosion independently of the degree of innovation. These results cannot be generalized without empirical evidence to every single country with a highly regulated market. This a pending task for researchers.

Acknowledgments

This study was supported by an unrestricted educational grant from the Merck Foundation, the philanthropic arm of Merck & Co. Inc., Whitehouse Station, New Jersey, USA. Partial funding was also obtained from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Education under grant SEJ2007-66133.

Appendix A. List of 114 NCEs included in the study

(1 is the acute condition as main indication)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rabeprazole</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esomeprazole</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dsomalate</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levosulpiride</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifaximine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racocodotril</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insulin aspart</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insulin glargine</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insulin detemir</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glimipride</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miglitol</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosiglitazone</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pioglitazone</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repaglinide</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nateglinide</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix (Continued)

Tinzaparine 1
Benzaparine 1
Clopixol 0
Fondaparinux 0
Moxonidine 0
Eplerenone 1
Nebivolol 1
Mandipine 0
Barnidipin 1
Lercanidipine 0
Spirapril 0
Imidapril 1
Eprosartan 1
Valsartan 1
Irbesartan 0
Candesartan 1
Telmisartan 0
Olmesartan medoxomil 0
Atorvastatine 0
Cerivastatine 0
Triglyceride omega-3 1
Ezetimib 0
Dienogest + Estrogen 1
Raloxifene 1
Tolterodine 1
Solfenacine 0
Tamsulosin 0
Dutasteride 0
Pegvisomant 0
Ganirelix 0
Teriparatide 0
Cefidorin pivoxil 1
Telitomazine 0
Grepafloxacin 0
Trovafloxacin 1
Moxifloxacin 1
Valganciclovir 0
Brivudin 0
Capcitabine 0
Bexarotene 1
Imatinib 0
Anagrelide 0
Fulvestrant 0
Anastrozole 0
Letrozole 0
Sirolimus 0
Everolimus 0
Efalizumab 0
Lornoxicam 1
Dexibuprofene 1
Celecoxib 1
Rofecoxib 0
Etoricoxib 0
Diclofenac 1
Tiludronic acid 0
Risendronic acid 0
Strontium ranelate 1
Oxidone 1
Naratriptane 0
Zolmitriptane 0
Rizatriptane 0
Amitriptane 1
Eletriptane 0
Frovatriptane 0
Oxcarbazepine 0
Tiagabine 0
Topiramate 0
Levetiracetam 0
Pregabalin 0
Ropinirole 0
Pramipexole 0
Tolcapone 0

Appendix (Continued)

Entacapone 0
Sertindole 0
Ziprasidone 0
Quetiapine 0
Amisulpride 0
Aripiprazole 0
Zaleplon 0
Escitalopram 0
Nefazodone 0
Reboxetine 1
Modafinil 0
Donepezil 0
Rivastigmine 1
Galantamine 0
Memantine 1
Atovaquone 0
Hydroxychloroquine 1
Flucitacose (inalat) 1
Tiotropium bromide 0
Zafirlukast 0
Montelukast 0
Levocetirizine 1
Mizolastine 1
Fexofenadine 0
Desloratadine 0
Rupatadine 1
Sevelamer 0

References


