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Publications: Decision Makers Facing Uncertainty: Theory versus Evidence (joint with Paolo E. Giordani and Sanne Zwart), Journal of Economic Psychology (forthcoming) (2010).Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium (joint with Ludovic Renou), Games and Economic Behavior (forthcoming) (2010). Similarities and Differences when Building Trust: the Role of Cultures (joint with Fabian Bornhorst, Andrea Ichino, Oliver Kirchkamp, Eyal Winter), Experimental Economics (published online 30 April 2010). Minimax Regret and Strategic Uncertainty (joint with Ludovic Renou), Journal of Economic Theory 145(1) (2010), 264-286. Pricing without Priors, (joint with Dirk Bergemann), J. EEA 6(2-3) ( 2008) , 560-569 . Imitation and Social Learning (joint with Carlos Allos Ferrer), chapter in Handbook of Rational and Social Choice , P. Anand, P. Pattanaik and C. Puppe (eds.), Oxford University Press (2007, forthcoming). Choice under Complete Uncertainty when Outcome Spaces are State-Dependent (joint with Clemens Puppe), Theory and Decision (2007, forthcoming, available online)On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria (joint with Dieter Balkenborg), Journal of Economic Theory 133(1) (2007), 295 – 315. “An Evolutionary Theory of Inflation Inertia,” (joint with Omar Licandro, Alexis Anagnostopoulos, und Italo Bove), J. EEA, 5(2-3) ( 2007 ), 433 – 443. Evolutionäre Spieltheorie (Evolutionary Game Theory, text in German), Handbook of Evolutionary Economics , Vol. II Chapter 2, forthcoming.Evolutionary Insights on the Willingness to Communicate (joint with Sjaak Hurkens), International Journal of Game Theory 31(4) (2003), 511–526. Extensive Form Bandits (joint with Ross Cressman), The Dynamics of Extensive Form Evolutionary Games , Chapter 8.4, MIT Press, 2003. Evolutionarily Stable Sets (joint with Dieter Balkenborg), International Journal of Game Theory 29(4) (2001), 571–595.Group Report: Why and When Do Simple Heuristics Work? (joint with D. Goldstein, G. Gigerenzer, R. Hogarth, A. Kacelnik, Y. Kareev, G. Klein, L. Martignon und J. Payne), Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox , Gigerenzer, G. & Selten, R. (Eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. Sophisticated Imitation in Cyclic Games (joint with Josef Hofbauer), Journal of Evolutionary Economics , 10(5) (2000), 523–543. Does Noise Undermine the First-Mover Advantage? An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example (joint with Jörg Oechsler), International Game Theory Review , 2(1) (2000), 83–96.Social Roles as an Effective Learning Mechanism (joint with Gregory Pollock),Rationality and Society 11(4) (1999), 371–397. Which One Should I Imitate? Journal of Mathematical Economics 31(4) (1999), 493–522.On the Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction (joint with Ross Cressman), Journal of Economic Theory 83 (1998), 260–285. Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits, Journal of Economic Theory 78(1) (1998), 130–156. You Play (An Action) Only Once (joint with Aner Sela), Economics Letters 59(3) (1998), 299–303.Book review, Samuelson, L.: Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection , MIT Press, Cambridge , Mass. , 1997, Journal of Economics / Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 68(1) (1998), 86–88. Book review, Weibull, J.W.: Evolutionary Game Theory , MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., In: Journal of Economics / Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 64(1) (1996), 113–115.
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Erstellt von: j.rackl@online.de
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Last Updated: 21.04.2009 |